Strategic technology partnering during the eighties: trends, networks and corporate patterns in non-core technologies. by Hagedoorn, John
research 
policy 
ELSEVIER  Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231 
Strategic technology partnering during the 1980s: 
trends, networks and corporate patterns in non-core 
technologies* 
John  Hagedoorn 
Maastricht  Economic Research Institute  on Innovation  and Technology (MERIT) and Department  of International  Business Studies, 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration,  University of Limburg,  PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,  Netherlands 
(Final version received October 1993) 
Abstract 
The growth of the number of inter-firm strategic technology alliances during the  1980s has led to considerable 
attention to this phenomenon in recent years. In this paper an attempt is made to understand not only basic trends 
in  the  growth  of inter-firm  cooperation  in  sectors  such  as  chemicals,  aviation/defence,  automotive  and  heavy 
electrical equipment, but also to reveal the role played by a large group of cooperating companies. The research is 
based on a large databank with information on thousands of alliances and their participating companies. Through 
statistical  analysis  it  is  possible  to  identify  the  major  players within  these  sectors.  The  analysis  enables  us  to 
recognize the  major international  networks of inter-firm alliances,  the  changes over time and  different  positions 
taken by world leading companies. 
I. Introduction 
The study of strategic technology partnering is 
to  a  large  extent  concentrated  in  so-called  high- 
tech  industries  or  core  technologies  (see  Hage- 
doorn  [3,4],  Hagedoorn  and  Schakenraad  [5-7], 
Mowery [9],  and Mytelka [10],  to name but a  few 
examples). In the present paper I will attempt to 
contribute to the understanding  of strategic tech- 
nology partnering  in  a  broader industrial  setting 
with  an analysis of trends,  market structural  pat- 
* This study was partly financed by the Monitor-FAST Pro- 
gram of the EC. The author would like to thank Jos Schaken- 
raad for assistance with the statistical analysis. Helpful com- 
ments by two referees are gratefully acknowledged. 
terns,  and  networks  of inter-firm  agreements  in 
four  industrial  sectors,  i.e.  chemicals,  aviation 
and  defence,  automotive  and  heavy  electrical 
equipment.  Although  strategic  alliances  in  these 
sectors have not  been  completely neglected  they 
certainly have not  been  studied  to  the  same  de- 
gree as the alliances in fields such as information 
technology  and  biotechnology.  Data  from  the 
MERIT -  Cooperative Agreements and Technol- 
ogy Indicators  (CATI) databank  suggest  that  al- 
liances  in  chemicals,  aviation/defence,  automo- 
tive  and  heavy electrical  equipment  account  for 
about 25% of the strategic alliances made during 
the  1980s.  A  much  larger  share  of the  strategic 
alliances,  i.e.  about  70%  of  the  alliances  made 
during  the  1980s,  are  related  to  the  new  core 
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technologies: information technology, biotechnol- 
ogy  and  new  materials.  However,  these  figures 
also indicate that the four sectors studied in the 
present contribution appear to be the only other 
fields for which substantial numbers of inter-firm 
alliances were found. 
Apart  from  a  sectoral  restriction  I  will  also 
limit the analysis to those inter-firm agreements 
for which the transfer of technology or the cre- 
ation of new technology through R&D or other 
innovative efforts are  central  to  the  agreement. 
This eliminates a wide range of exclusively  mar- 
keting,  production  or  sales  agreements.  I  will 
confine the analysis to particular modes of part- 
nering such as joint ventures for which common 
R&D or technology sharing is a major objective, 
research corporations, joint R & D pacts, and mi- 
nority holdings coupled with research contracts. 
The analysis refers to alliances made by compa- 
nies on a  "private" basis,  excluding national and 
international shared-cost programmes, which fa- 
cilitates the understanding of patterns of "pure" 
inter-firm technology sharing, i.e.  strategic part- 
nering  for  which  the  incentive  is  found within 
groups  of firms  themselves.  Another  important 
restriction is the definition of strategic alliances 
as  those inter-firm agreements that can  reason- 
ably be assumed to affect the long-term product 
market positioning of at  least one  partner.  Fol- 
lowing  Hagedoorn  and  Schakenraad  [5], agree- 
ments that have a mainly cost-economizing char- 
acter are excluded from the following analysis. 
The four sectors in this study are identified in 
terms of rather  general product groups.  Chemi- 
cals  comprises  inter-firm  agreements  in  bulk 
chemicals  and  petrochemicals,  fertilizers,  syn- 
thetic  materials  pharmaceuticals  (except  those 
generated by biotechnology); specialty chemicals 
such as pesticides and photochemicals; industrial 
gases;  toilet  preparations,  soap  and  detergents; 
paints,  dyestuffs and  pigments.  The  automotive 
sector  covers  alliances  aimed  at  designing new 
models  and  developing  parts  and  components, 
such as engines for cars, trucks, motor cycles, and 
agricultural equipment. The next field is the avia- 
tion/ defence sector with alliances in various kind 
of  aircraft,  both  civil and  military;  helicopters; 
aircraft engines; relevant parts  and components; 
missiles;  defence electronics systems;  space tech- 
nology (satellites, rockets, space shuttles). Finally, 
heavy electrical equipment includes nuclear and 
solar  energy,  turbines,  generators,  railway  and 
other electrical equipment. 
The core of this article is the empirical analysis 
of historical patterns of strategic technology part- 
nering and the evolution of inter-firm networks in 
the four above-mentioned sectors. Most attention 
is  paid  to  the  identification of basic  trends  in 
strategic technology alliances, the main "actors" 
and  their  networks; if possible,  a  comparison  is 
made with some of the relevant findings for new 
core  technologies.  In  order  to  reconstruct  net- 
works of strategic alliances I will apply a multidi- 
mensional scaling technique, measure variation in 
network density and analyze the stability in groups 
of leading cooperating companies comparing the 
first half of the  1980s with the second half. The 
graphical  presentation  is  somewhat  space-con- 
suming,  but  it  enables  me  to  identify concrete 
networks and the changes in the positions taken 
by the major companies involved. 
2. Trends in strategic technology alliances during 
the 1980s 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad [7] expressed the 
view that, based on a  substantial body of litera- 
ture and their own empirical findings, one could 
expect  a  growth  of  strategic  alliances  in  many 
sectors  during  the  1980s. However,  it  was  also 
stated  that  the  growth  pattern  of  strategic  al- 
liances would gradually stabilize or even .shown a 
declining growth towards the  end  of the  1980s. 
This was thought to be due to the experience of 
companies with organizational problems,  oppor- 
tunistic  behaviour  of partners,  and  the  limited 
success  of  strategic  alliances  that  are  not  a 
panacea  for many of the  problems  that compa- 
nies face. In short, strategic technology alliances 
do  not  necessarily  lead  to  win-win  situations. 
With  the  phenomenon  of  strategic  technology 
partnering  becoming  a  more  regular  aspect  of 
corporate  behaviour, firms could become  some- 
what  more  conscious  of  the  above  mentioned 
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growth of newly made agreements. Such a  stag- 
nating  growth  pattern  during  the  eighties  was 
found for a  number of sub-fields in information 
technology  and  also  in  new  materials  and 
biotechnology (see  Hagedoorn and  Schakenraad 
[5-7]).  If such a pattern is found for much of the 
new  core  technologies  or  new  technological 
paradigms,  it  seems  interesting  to  see  whether 
this is also present in the more traditional sectors 
we study in the present contribution. Therefore, 
the first research question is: 
Whether  the  number  of strategic  technology 
partnering  agreements  established  during  the 
1980s has increased continuously or, if there is a 
certain degree of saturation after companies built 
up some experience with this relatively new mode 
of  inter-firm  organisation,  does  this  lead  to  a 
decrease in the number of new alliances? 
As  shown  in  Fig.  1,  the  pattern  of all  newly 
established  strategic  technology alliances  found 
in the MERIT-CATI databank demonstrates that 
the first years of the 1980s are characterized by a 
somewhat constant increase of new agreements, 
followed by  a  sharp  rise  during the  mid  1980s, 
which is continued by a somewhat slower rate of 
increase  during  the  final years  of the  1980s. If 
one compares the first half of the decade with the 
second  half  it  is  found  that  over  60%  of  all 
alliances  have  been  made  since  1985. In  other 
words,  this  pattern  does  not  appear  to  provide 
any verification of the implicit hypothesis in the 
above mentioned research question suggesting a 
flattening of the growth rate in strategic technol- 
ogy partnering. 
At  the  sectoral  level,  in  the  four  industries 
analyzed  in  this  contribution  there  appears  a 
somewhat differentiated pattern. In particular in 
chemicals and, to a lesser degree, in the automo- 
tive  industry, one notices a substantial growth of 
new alliances made during the second half of the 
1980s. In the aviation and defence industry there 
is a rather fluctuating growth pattern with further 
growth towards the end of the decade. In heavy 
electrical equipment the general pattern is one of 
gradual growth with a few ups and downs. 
In general, this sectoral pattern does not sup- 
port the idea that the growth of strategic technol- 
ogy alliances stagnate if companies build up some 
experience  with  this  phenomenon.  An  explana- 
tion  for  this  could  be  found  in  the  novelty of 
strategic  technology partnering  in  these  sectors 
and the relatively small numbers of alliances for 
these otherwise large sectors. Compared with for 
instance,  many  sectors  within  the  information 
technology industry, sectors such as the automo- 
tive, aviation/defence, chemicals and heavy elec- 
trical equipment industries are still characterized 
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tures and R& D pacts. In these sectors, in partic- 
ular in  the  electrical equipment  industry and  in 
chemicals, there is  a  long history of cooperation 
through cartel-like organizations, excess capacity 
cutting  agreements  and  licensing.  These  largely 
defensive agreements might create an  industrial 
climate  where  cooperation  is  part  of corporate 
strategies, but it was not until recently that more 
offensive technology cooperation oriented agree- 
ments  were  introduced  on  a  somewhat  larger 
scale.  Such  sectoral  differences  between  fields 
where a  large group of companies built  up  sub- 
stantial experience in this phenomenon, as in the 
information  technology  industries,  and  sectors 
where  this  phenomenon  is  less  abounding,  sug- 
gest  that  corporate  experience  with  strategic 
technology partnering  influences the  propensity 
to engage in such alliances for longer periods. In 
many of the new core technologies related fields, 
the  growth of strategic technology partnering  is 
tending  to  stagnate.  This  probably  indicates  a 
somewhat more careful attitude towards strategic 
technology  cooperation  once  companies  have 
gained some experience in it. The sectors studied 
in the present paper are still  in an early stage of 
applying  these  strategic  technology  partnering 
agreements, which suggests that the  growth pat- 
tern  found during  the  second  half of the  1980s 
could  follow  the  same  pattern  as  in  new  core 
technologies, but with a time lag of several years. 
3. The structure of networks of strategic technol- 
ogy partnering 
In  the  literature  it  is  suggested  by  several 
authors,  see e.g.  Casson  [1], Chesnais  [2], Hage- 
doorn and Schakenraad [7] and Mytelka [10], that 
the increase of strategic alliances has been some- 
what  asymmetrical in  the  sense  that  some  large 
companies have established a substantial number 
of inter-firm  links  thereby  dominating  strategic 
technology partnering. A  discussion of the differ- 
ent  theoretical  positions  taken  in  that  debate 
does not seem appropriate in the present context. 
However,  a  relevant  question  is  whether  some 
companies  play  a  central  role  in  strategic  al- 
liances  and  consequently  strategic  technology 
partnerships  are  unevenly  distributed  towards 
"nodal" companies.  If that  is  the  case,  one can 
expect the  linkages of these firms to have esca- 
lated during the second half of the  1980s, which 
should  show  up  in  the  analysis  of  intensified 
inter-firm  partnerships  at  the  sectoral  level.  In 
addition to this,  one would expect a  stable  net- 
work of major cooperating firms in the sense that 
the  companies  with  most  strategic  links  during 
the  first half of the  1980s will  also take  leading 
positions during the second half of the decade. 
Apart  from  the  empirically interesting  ques- 
tion  as  to  which  companies  are  actually  major 
collaborators and whether their position changes 
over time,  this  topic  leads  me  to  two  research 
questions: 
does the overall increase of strategic technol- 
ogy  linkages  of  companies  during  the  1980s 
demonstrate a denser network of leading compa- 
nies, and 
to what extent is there an association between 
the  order of companies with  the  most  strategic 
links  during the first and the second half of the 
1980s,  indicating stability in  the  group of major 
partnering companies? 
Based on these questions one can first formu- 
late  the  hypothesis  that  an  intensification  of 
strategic  technology partnering  during  the  past 
decade should show up in increased network den- 
sities  for  the  sectors  studied  in  this  paper.  To 
uncover some aspects of structural centrality of a 
network, I computed a network density index for 
each sector. This density index is  defined as  the 
ratio of the actual number of links between com- 
panies  (k)  to  the  possible  number  of  links 
1/2n(n-1)  where  n  denotes  the  number  of 
points in the network. For each sector the density 
for a  group of 45 most actively cooperating corn- 
Table 1 
A comparison of sectoral network densities for 1980-1984 
and 1985-1989 
1980-84  1985-89 
Automotive  0.072  0.094 
Aviation/Defence  0.187  0.233 
Chemicals  0.121  0.200 
Heavy Electrical  Equipment  0.089  0.134 J. Hagedoorn / Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231  211 
panies  is  calculated;  these  groups  will  also  be 
analyzed  in  more  detail  through  a  multi-dimen- 
sional scaling technique. 
The network densities in all these sectors show 
a  substantial increase  comparing the first half of 
the  1980s  with  the  second  half  (Table  1).  The 
Table 2 
The top 45 companies with strategic technology links in automotive, aviation/defence, chemicals and heavy electrical equipment, 
1980-1984  and 1985-1989 
Automotive 
1980-1984  1985-1989 
Renault  21  General Motors Corp.  29 
Fiat  20  Mitshubishi  27 
Peugeot  18  Fiat  25 
Volvo  16  Nissan Motor Co.  25 
Mitshubishi  15  Isuzu Motors  24 
Toyota Motor Corp.  14  Toyota Motor Corp.  22 
Mazda Motor Co.  13  Mazda Motor Corp.  21 
Nissan Motor Co.  13  Ford Motor Corp.  18 
Ford Motor Co.  12  Renault  16 
Honda Motor Co.  12  Chrysler Motor Corp.  15 
General Motors Corp.  10  Peugeot  15 
Isuzu Motors  10  Volvo  15 
DAF Trucks  8  Daimler-Benz  10 
Volkswagen  8  Honda Motor Co.  10 
Daimler-Benz  7  DAF Trucks  9 
American Motors Corp.  6  Volkswagen  9 
Chrysler Motor Corp.  6  Allied Signal  8 
Navistar Int.  6  Suzuki Co.  8 
Suzuki Co.  6  Bosch  7 
Bosch  4  Eaton Corp.  7 
IRI  4  Fuji Heavy Industries  7 
Kia Motors Corp.  4  Gutehoffnungzhiitte Aktienverein  7 
Saab-Scania  4  Sumitomo  7 
Sumitomo  4  Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank  5 
Valmet  4  Olivetti  5 
Borg-Warner Corp.  3  Rockwell Int. Corp.  5 
Eaton Corp.  3  Tokai  5 
Fuyo  3  British Aerospace  4 
Lucas Industries  3  Fuyo  4 
Nippon Steel Corp.  3  General Electric Co.  4 
Van Doorne's Transmissie  3  Kl6ckner-Homboldt-Deutx  4 
Cummins Engine Co.  2  Kia Motors Corp.  4 
Fruehauf (K-N Corp.)  2  Masco Industries  4 
Fuji Heavy Industries  2  Navistar Int.  4 
Kl6ckner-Homboldt-Deutz  2  Nippon Steel Corp.  4 
Komatsu  2  Saab-Scania  4 
Masco Industries  2  Thomspon Eamo Wooldridge  4 
Porsche  2  United Technologies Corp.  4 
Rockwell Int. Corp.  2  Alcan Aluminium  3 
Rover  2  Hyundai Corp.  3 
Signal Companies  2  Lucas Industries  3 
United Stirling  2  Matsushita Elect. Industrial Co.  3 
United Technologies Corp.  2  Siemens  3 
Valeo  2  Valmet  3 
Yamaha Motor Co.  2  Van Doorne's Transmissie  3 212  J. Hagedoorn / Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231 
exception is  the  automotive industry, where  the 
network density has "only" increased from 7% to 
nearly  9.5%.  In  the  aviation/defence  industry 
and  the  chemical  industry,  on  the  other  hand, 
one can even find rather dense networks. During 
the second half of the 1980s at least 20% of the 
theoretically  possible  inter-firm  links  between 
groups of leading cooperating firms in these two 
Table 2 (continued) 
Aviation/defence 
1980-1984  1985-1989 
Messerschmitt-B61kow-Blohm  54 
A6rospatiale  31 
Daimler-Benz  24 
Dai-lchi Kangyo Bank  24 
Mitsubishi  23 
Hughes Aircraft Co.  22 
Snecma  22 
British Aerospace  21 
IRI  21 
Fokker  20 
Thomson  19 
Fiat  17 
McDonnell Douglas Corp.  17 
United Technologies Corp.  17 
Sumitomo  14 
Avions M. Dassault-Breguet Aviation  12 
EFIM  12 
Hitachi  12 
Rolls Royce  12 
Soci&~ G~n~rale  12 
Ericsson  11 
General Electric Co.  11 
Rockwell Int. Corp.  11 
Boeing Aerospace Co.  10 
Cie. G~n~rale  d'l~lectricit~  10 
Fiat  10 
GEC  10 
Montadel Laden  10 
Oerlikon BiJhrle  10 
Sener Ingenieria y Sistemas  10 
Martin-Marietta Corp.  9 
Matra  9 
Textron  9 
Westland  9 
Fuji Heavy Industries  8 
Ishika-Wajima Harim Co.  8 
Plessey Co.  8 
Raytheon  8 
Sonaca  8 
Saab-Scania  7 
Instituto Nacional de Industria  6 
Siemens  6 
Fairchild Industries  5 
Ford Motor Co.  5 
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fields  are  actually  found.  In  other words,  at  this 
somewhat  aggregated  level  of  analysis  one  does 
find  an  overall  increase  of  inter-firm  strategic 
technology  partnering  reflected  in  network  den- 
sity indicators for a relatively large group of corn- 
panies.  For new core technologies,  such as infor- 
mation  technologies  and  new materials,  the  net- 
work density increase is comparable  [6,7]. 
Turning  to  the  second  research  question  of 
this section,  I refer to Table  2, which lists the 45 
Table 2 (continued) 
Chemicals 
1980-1984  1985-1989 
Mitsui  27 
Dai-lchi Kangyo Bank  26 
Mitsubishi  25 
Shell  25 
Sumitomo  25 
Dow Chemical Co.  20 
Fuyo  18 
Hoechst  18 
Solvay & Cie.  17 
BASF  16 
Ferruzzi  15 
DSM  14 
Imperial Chemical Industries  14 
Du Pont de Nemours  13 
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi  13 
Exxon Corp.  13 
Texaco  13 
Union Carbide Corp.  13 
Bayer  12 
British Petroleum Co.  12 
Industrial Bank of Japan  12 
Veba  12 
Sanwa  11 
Akzo  10 
Petrofina  10 
Asahi Chemical Industry Co.  9 
Phillips Petroleum Co.  9 
Saudi Basic Industries Corp.  9 
Celanese Corp.  7 
Hercules  7 
Norsk Hydro  7 
Rh6ne-Poulenc  7 
Signal Companies  7 
ELF Aquitaine  6 
Toyo Soda Corp.  6 
Cie. Fran~aise de P&rol  5 
Fujisawa  Pharmaceutical  5 
JGC Corp.  5 
Monsanto Co.  5 
Nissan Motor Co.  5 
Occidental Petroleum Co.  5 
Pirelli  5 
Raytheon Co.  5 
Amoco  5 






Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank 
Hoechst 
Du Pont de Nemours 
Solvay & Cie. 
Dow Chemical Co. 
Fuyo 







Saudi Basic Industries Corp. 
Bayer 
Industrial Bank of Japan 
Union Carbide Corp. 
British Petroleum Co. 
General Electric Co. 
Asahi Chemical Industry Co. 
Veba 
Neste 
ABB Asea Brown Boveri 
Occidental Petroleum Co. 
Sanwa 
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi 
Texaco 
Denki Kagutu Kogyo Co. 
Japan Synthetic Rubber Co. 
Monsanto Co. 
Petrofina 
Rio Tinto-Zinc Corp. 
Atlantic Richfield Co. 
Continental 
Hercules 
Kyowa tlakko Kogyo 
Norsk Hydro 















































7 214  J. Hagedoorn / Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231 
companies with most strategic links in each sector 
during the first and the second half of the 1980s. 
For  each  sector  it  is  obvious  that  many of the 
leading companies are well represented. The hi- 
erarchy  of  leading  cooperating  companies  does 
change over time, but the firms found on the list 
for the first half of the 1980s that are also part of 
the  top  45  during  the  second  half  remains  re- 
Table 2 (continued) 
Heavy electrical equipment 
1980-1984  1985-1989 
Hitachi  25 
Toshiba Corp.  21 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank  17 
Ishika-Wajima  Harima Co.  16 
Mitsubishi  14 
Siemens  13 
Mitsui  12 
Westinghouse  12 
Bechtel  11 
Int. Tel.& Telegraph Corp.  11 
General Electric Co.  10 
McDermott Int.  9 
Brown Boveri&  Co.  7 
Northern Engineering Industries  7 
Sanwa  7 
Allis-Chalmers Corp.  6 
Asea  6 
Babcock Int.  6 
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi  6 
Energie  & Verfahrungstechnik  6 
Fuyo  6 
Nobel Industries  6 
Texaco  6 
British International Cable Corp.  5 
Cie. G~n6rale d'l~lectricit~  5 
Combustion Engineering  5 
Electrobel  5 
Fiat  5 
GEC  5 
Shell  5 
Sulzer  5 
Sumitomo  5 
Tractebel  5 
VMF-Stork  5 
Volvo  5 
AEG  4 
Atlantic Richfield Co.  4 
Elektro Sandberg  4 
Fluidcarbon Int.  4 
Friedrich Flick Industrie  4 
IRI  4 
Messerschmitt-B61kow-Blohm  4 
Thyssen  4 
Framatome  3 
Soci~t~ G~n6rale  3 
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markably  high.  For instance,  for  the  automotive 
sector  the  percentage  of  'stayers'  is  73%,  for 
aviation and defence it is 80%, for chemicals it is 
73% and for the sector of heavy electrical  equip- 
ment it is 76%. If Spearman rank correlations are 
calculated,  comparing the  rank order  during the 
first  half of the  1980s with  the  second  half,  one 
finds  relatively  high  and  significant  correlations. 
The rank correlation for leading cooperating firms 
in  the  automotive industry is 0.61,  for  aviation/ 
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defence  it  is  0.46,  for  chemicals  it  is  0.57,  for 
heavy electrical equipment it is 0.32.  The correla- 
tions for all these fields are significant at the 0.01 
level,  with  the  exception  of  heavy  electrical 
equipment where the  rank  correlation  is signifi- 
cant  at  the  0.05  level.  In  other  words,  some 
companies  change  position  in  the  rank  order, 
others leave or enter the group of leading cooper- 
ating firms, but on the whole networks of leading 
technology partnering firms in these four sectors 
appear to be relatively  stable configurations. 
In order  to  expand  on  the  analysis  presented 
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above  and  to  give  some  further  details  about 
increased  partnering  behaviour by firms,  a  non- 
metric multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique 
is used [8,12].  Such a  graphical representation of 
the  sectoral  networks  of cooperating companies 
with  some  simple  additional  tools  can  give  a 
concrete  overview  of  network  structures  that 
complements network density indicators that  un- 
derestimate  the  actual  density  owing  to  the  ne- 
glect  of multiple  inter-firm  linkages.  MDS  is  a 
data  reduction  procedure  comparable  to  princi- 
pal  component analysis  and  other factor-analyti- 
cal  methods.  One  of  the  main  advantages  of 
MDS  is  that  it  can  fit  an  appropriate  model  in 
fewer dimensions than factor-analytical methods. 
This increases the possibility of easy interpretable 
two-dimensional  pictures.  MDS  offers scaling of 
similarity  data  into  points  lying in  an  X-dimen- 
sional  space.  The  purpose  of this  method  is  to 
provide coordinates for these points in such a way 
that distances between pairs of points fit as closely 
as possible  to the  observed similarities.  In order 
to facilitate interpretation the solution is given in 
two dimensions, provided that the fit of the model 
is  acceptable.  A  stress  value  indicates  the  good- 
ness-of-fit of the configuration. For all MDS solu- 
tions  presented  in  this  paper  the  stress  values 
range from acceptable to good. I Since it is tech- 
nically  impossible  to  picture  all  firms  in  each 
sectoral network, the  analysis is restricted to the 
interrelations  of  the  45  firms  having  the  most 
ongoing strategic linkages in a given period. MDS 
solutions  are  presented  for  two  time  intervals, 
1980-1984 and  1985-1989.  For the first period I 
have taken all linkages established  in that partic- 
ular period plus those linkages made before 1980 
that, as far I know, were not already discontinued 
1  The stress values in the MDS analyses range from accept- 
able to good, as indicated in the following  table. 
1980-1984  1985-1989 
Automotive.  0.068  0.075 
Aviation/Defence.  0.082  0.096 
Chemicals.  0.076  0.113 
Heavy Electrical Equipment.  0.039  0.078 
in  1980.  For  the  second  period,  the  years  since 
1985, the same procedure is followed: all linkages 
forged  in  that  period  plus  those  linkages  from 
earlier years which were  not  already terminated 
before 1985  are taken together. Since the analysis 
is  at  the  parent  company level, alliances of sub- 
sidiaries and divisions are assigned to the parent 
company. Also within each period, the still exist- 
ing alliances of companies taken over by others or 
partnerships made by merging companies are as- 
signed  to the  acquiring  or the  newly established 
firm. 
To improve the  interpretation of the pictures, 
it  is  useful  to  draw  lines  of  different  shapes 
between  companies,  indicating  different degrees 
of cooperation intensity;  for company codes  see 
Appendix B. 
3.1.  Chemicals 
In  the  'chemicals'  network  of the  1980-1984 
period  American,  Japanese,  and  European  cor- 
porations are rather randomly distributed without 
a  strong regional clustering (see Fig. 2(a)). Many 
firms are involved in international  clusters.  Only 
a few important ties will be mentioned: Montedi- 
son  (Ferruzzi)  and  Hercules  created  Himont, 
which  was  dissolved  again  in  1987.  Phillips 
Petroleum  and  Sumitomo  worked  together  on 
LPE  production  processes,  Ferruzzi  and  Mitsui 
on catalysts, Du Pont and Mitsui on fluorochemi- 
cals,  Bayer  and  Sumitomo  on  urethane.  Many 
alliances  deal  with  expensive  new  process  tech- 
nologies,  and  therefore also  include  engineering 
firms.  An  example  of  a  large  consortium  is 
'Aethylen  Rohrleitungsgesellschaft',  in  which 
DSM, Bayer, Veba, BASF, Solvay, Dow, Hoechst, 
Shell and Exxon participate. 
In the second half of the  1980s (see Fig. 2(b)) 
the  many  newly  created  alliances  resulted  in  a 
much more dense network structure. Again, only 
a  few  of the  more  important  developments  are 
mentioned.  For  instance,  Ferruzzi  and  ENI 
merged their petrochemical interests to form Eni- 
mont. This was followed by a  large restructuring 
and  upgrading  of  chemical  and  pharmaceutical 
activities in which a large number of third compa- 
nies got involved, such as ICI (resulting in a joint 218  J. Hagedoorn / Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231 
venture in PVCs), Du Pont (pharmaceuticals) and 
Arco  (elastomers).  Other  examples  of  intensely 
cooperating  companies  are  Saudi  Arabia  Basic 
Industries  Corporation  (SABIC)  which  forged 
links  amongst others with Hoechst,  Exxon, ENI, 
Shell, Neste, Dow Chemical and Mitsubishi. Gen- 
eral  Electric  Plastics  (GEP)  started  a joint ven- 
ture with  a  Mitsubishi  affiliate,  Asahi  Glass,  on 
polycarbonate sheet  and film.  Mitsui established 
ties  with  Mitsubishi,  Denki  Kagatu,  General 
Electric,  and  Monsanto.  Another  example  of 
multi-firm cooperation is a joint research pact on 
CFC  alternatives,  established  by  Akzo,  Allied- 
Signal, ELF, Du Pont, Solvay, and RTZ. 
Detailed  analysis  of the  data  not  reproduced 
in this paper suggests that increased cooperation 
in this sector is caused by a relatively large num- 
ber  of  research  pacts  aimed  at  innovative  re- 
search on chemistry  and process engineering to- 
gether with joint restructuring and upgrading op- 
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erations  involving  many  new  process  technolo- 
gies.  This  has  resulted  in  a  dense  network  of 
cooperating  firms during the  second  half of the 
1980s  in  which  many  firms  have  a  comparable 
network centrality, 
3.2. Aviation / defence 
During the first half of the 1980s (see Fig. 3(a)) 
there  are already  a large number of cooperating 
European companies in the aviation  and defence 
sector.  Some  Japanese  corporations  can  also  be 
found  in  the  top  list  of  intensely  cooperating 
companies (see  also Table  2).  American  compa- 
nies,  which  are  world  leaders  in  such  areas  as 
civil and military  aircraft,  are present but not in a 
dominant way (McDonnell Douglas, General Dy- 
namics, Boeing, United Technologies), whilst oth- 
ers such as Lockheed are even missing. 
During  the  first  half of the  decade  there  are 
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already four important Japanese consortia: Japan 
Aero Engines, International Aero Engines, Japan 
Aircraft  Development  Corporation,  and  Japan 
Communications  Satellite.  These  consortia  have 
often linked up with US  and European partners 
(Boeing, Hughes Aircraft,  Rolls Royce).  Some of 
them  started  participating  in  large,  risk-sharing 
aircraft  programmes,  such  as  Boeing's  767  and 
later  on,  7J7  programmes.  Important  European 
joint  development  and  manufacturing  projects 
are: 
-  the ATR aircraft  project of Italian Aeritalia 
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(part  of  the  IRI  group)  and  the  French  firm 
AErospatiale; 
-European  Helicopters  Limited  of  Agusta 
(EFIM group) and Westland; 
-  Panavia  and Turbo-Union (both to build the 
Tornado combat aircraft); 
-  Airbus  Industrie  (of  AErospatiale,  British 
Aerospace,  CASA,  and  a  German  consortium 
headed by MBB); 
-  Euromissile; 
-  United  Satellites,  a  joint  venture  of  BT, 
GEC/Marconi and British Aerospace; 
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-  the Lynx and Gazelle  helicopter projects of 
Westland and A6rospatiale. 
Furthermore,  there  are  many  huge  bidding 
consortia  as well  as  relatively  small  tie-ups  and 
strategic cross-holdings in the European defence 
and aerospace  industry,  in particular in the UK, 
Belgium, France,  and Italy.  In Germany Daimler 
and MBB  play a  leading role.  Examples of US- 
European  alliances  are  CFM,  the  aero-engines 
joint  venture  of  GE  and  Snecma,  and  Saab- 
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Fairchild, which built turboprop aircraft (this joint 
venture  collapsed  in  1985).  US  finns  frequently 
teamed up in order to develop and build missiles, 
such  as  the AGM  missile  family,  Raytheon  and 
Hughes Aircraft,  Rockwell and Martin-Marietta, 
and General Dynamics-Raytheon. 
In  the  years  1985-1989  (see  Fig.  3(b))  the 
network has been  influenced  by important  take- 
overs:  GM  acquired  Hughes  Aircraft,  Daimler 
got control over MBB,  and  United Technologies 
bought  Westland.  In  this  period  many  new  air- 
craft,  aviation,  and  defence  joint  projects  were 
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started, but often by the same groups or consor- 
tia.  In  Europe  particular  the  number  of cross- 
holdings increased.  The  increased network den- 
sity mentioned above  is  also  found in  Fig.  3(b) 
where  one  can  see  that  European  companies 
have substantially increased their inter-firm link- 
ages. 
3.3. Automotive 
In the years 1980-1984  the top of the network 
for the automotive sector covers leading car and 
truck manufacturers as well as some large suppli- 
ers,  but  it  is  obvious  that  strategic  technology 
partnering has not  led  to  a  dense  network (see 
Fig.  4(a)).  Somewhat  denser  European  and 
Japanese  clusters  can  be  found;  the  former in- 
cludes Fiat, PSA, Renault, Volvo, etc. while Mit- 
subishi,  Toyota, Mazda, Nissan, and Honda form 
the  core  of the  Japanese  cluster.  An American 
equivalent is missing as the leading US  car pro- 
ducers  (GM,  Ford,  Chrysler, American Motors) 
take  highly divergent  positions  in  the  network. 
American Motors teamed up with Renault, GM 
with Isuzu, Suzuki,  and Toyota, Chrysler set up 
Diamond-Star Motors with Mitsubishi, while Ford 
cooperated intensely with Mazda. United Stifling 
and VDT  are  small innovative companies which 
attracted  attention  from  large  corporations 
through partnerships. 
In the second half of the 1980s (see Fig. 4(b)) 
the  European  cluster  still  operates,  whilst  the 
Japanese  subgroup  has  disintegrated somewhat, 
primarily because of new international linkages of 
Honda  and  Nissan.  The  leading  American  car 
makers,  GM,  Ford,  and  Chrysler still  act  inde- 
pendently  of  each  other  as  far  as  their  core 
activities are  involved  (except  one  link between 
GM  and  Chrysler: Chrysler's subsidiary Acustar 
is  involved  in  a  components joint  venture  with 
GM).  There  is  also  the  emergence  of suppliers 
such as Alcan, Siemens and Matsushita. The lat- 
ter,  for  instance,  teamed  up  with  Mazda  and 
Ford  in  order  to  develop  and  produce  car  air- 
conditioning and heating units. Siemens and Al- 
lied-Signal  signed  an  agreement jointly  to  de- 
velop, manufacture and sell new products to the 
world motor industry. Other companies got net- 
work  positions  owing  to  take-overs,  such  as 
Olivetti which acquired French Valeo, and British 
Aerospace which got control over major parts of 
the Rover Group. 
This  disaggregated analysis of inter-firm net- 
works confirms the findings on network density in 
the sense that the international automotive indus- 
try is  less  dense  in  terms  of the  multiplicity of 
inter-firm strategic technology alliances than the 
other sectors discussed in this paper. 
3.4. Heavy electrical equipment 
The  international heavy electrical  equipment 
sector  is  characterized  by  moderate  partnering 
intensity during the first half of the 1980s which 
increased substantially during the second half of 
the  1980s. During  the  first  half  of  the  1980s, 
Japanese industrial groups together with compa- 
nies  such  as  Toshiba  and  Hitachi  form a  clear 
separate  block  in  the  industry. These  Japanese 
companies frequently work together as co-devel- 
opers and consortium members in such areas as 
railway  equipment  and  power  generation  (Fig. 
5(a)).  Some Japanese companies have strong ties 
with  American  companies,  for  instance  Hitachi 
and  in  particular  Mitsubishi, which maintains a 
broad  array of ties with Westinghouse. Many of 
the other European and US companies have indi- 
vidual tie-ups with a  small number  of partners. 
Siemens is an example of a European firm with a 
higher degree  of network centrality through its 
alliances  with  AEG,  Allis-Chalmers,  Brown- 
Boveri,  MBB and Thyssen. 
In  the  years  after  1984 many  restructuring 
activities have taken place in this industry which 
are  also reflected in the strategic partnering be- 
haviour of many of the leading firms. Particularly 
in  Europe,  strategic  technology  partnering  in 
fields such as nuclear energy, railway equipment 
and heavy electrical equipment involving compa- 
nies  such  as  AEG,  MBB  (both  controlled  by 
Daimler),  Brown-Boveri,  Asea  (now  Asea 
Brown-Boveri),  CGE,  GEC,  Siemens,  and  IRI 
play a crucial role (see Fig. 5(b)). Some examples 
of recent tie-ups are: J. Hagedoorn / Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231  225 
-  in  1988 Britain's  GEC  and  French  CGE 
combine their interests in power generation, elec- 
tricity and railway equipment in a new company, 
GEC-Alstom; 
-  GEC, CGE, and GE create a joint venture 
to develop, produce and sell gas turbines; 
-  GEC's Belgian Vynckier unit and GE's Ital- 
ian COGENEC merge to form a new firm which 
will develop and produce a broad range of elec- 
trical items; 
-  ABB  and  Siemens (through  KWU)  design 
and construct low capacity high temperature re- 
actors and develop railway signalling equipment; 
-  Siemens and Framatome combine their nu- 
clear power industries, cooperate in related fields 
such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, and plan future 
generations of nuclear reactors; 
-  ABB merges its Italian industrial assets with 
units of Finmeccanica (IRI) to streamline Italy's 
electrical engineering industry; 
-  ABB and Rolls-Royce combine their exper- 
tise on gas turbines. 
Fig. 5(b)  also indicates that during the second 
half of the  1980s the Japanese industrial groups 
and  leading  US  firms  in  heavy  electrics  (IT-F, 
Westinghouse, GE) maintained their network po- 
sitions  within  a  clearly more  dense  network  of 
alliances. In particular the Japanese companies in 
this sector form a clear "cluster" with a substan- 
tial number of national partnerships. 
4.  Conclusions 
In  a  recent  contribution by  Parkhe  [11]  it  is 
suggested that a  major problem for research on 
international joint ventures, and I assume also for 
strategic alliances, is the lack of a strong theoreti- 
cal framework that facilitates the understanding 
of  inter-firm  cooperation.  This  shortcoming  is 
reflected in both the  strategic management and 
the  industrial  economics  literature-related  as- 
pects of this topic. The present contribution re- 
flects this problem as the explanatory framework 
is still  limited and the core of the contribution is 
found  in  the  empirical  and  largely  descriptive 
content of the paper. Nevertheless, some interest- 
ing conclusions from the present line of investiga- 
tion can be drawn. 
In  previous  work  I  presented  an  analysis of 
some  of the  characteristics of the  inter-sectoral 
differentiation of strategic technology partnering 
and the sectoral determinants of corporate part- 
nering  behaviour  [3]. A  major  finding  of  that 
analysis for a  large number of industries is  that 
the  R& D  intensity or the level  of technological 
sophistication of sectors  is  positively correlated 
with  the  technology partnering  intensity of sec- 
tors. In particular for new core technologies, such 
as  information  technologies,  biotechnology and 
new  materials,  inter-firm  strategic  technology 
partnering  seems  related  to  the  emergence  of 
new  technological paradigms.  The  development 
of these  new  technological paradigms  demands 
the wider application of a range of technological 
capabilities  that  often  go  beyond  the  existing 
technological strength of individual firms. Explor- 
ing technological complementarities of companies 
through inter-firm cooperation becomes a viable 
and  often  necessary  option  in  a  world  of  in- 
creased international competition and rapid tech- 
nological change.  In that sense the  dynamics of 
technological and economic development in sec- 
tors affected by new core technologies to a large 
extent appears to explain the notable role played 
by  these  fields,  which  cover  about  70%  of  all 
strategic  technology alliances  made  during  the 
1980s. 
Although  technology  partnering  in  the  new 
core technologies has attracted most public atten- 
tion,  the  impact  of this  aspect  of corporate  be- 
haviour on  a  wider range of sectors  of industry 
should not be neglected. The internationalisation 
of the  economy, increased  competition through 
innovation and the general national and interna- 
tional restructuring of industries also affects the 
four  sectors  studied  above.  The  analysis  so  far 
demonstrates  that  there,  too,  this  phenomenon 
has  clearly  become  more  important  since  the 
second half of the eighties. As it has become so 
widespread, affecting so many companies, strate- 
gic  technology partnering is  expected to  remain 
an important aspect of corporate behaviour for a 
substantial period of time. The absence of a long 
history of alliance-building and  also  the  smaller 226  J. Hagedoorn / Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231 
numbers  of partnerships  in  some  sectors  could 
indicate less pervasive experience of large groups 
of companies in these fields. This lack of experi- 
ence  or  the  early stages of learning to  manage 
alliances could positively affect the propensity of 
firms to engage in technology partnerships owing 
to a certain degree of "naivety". Future research 
with  longer  time-series  is  necessary  to  provide 
more insight into the effect that both positive and 
negative experience will have on corporate part- 
nering behaviour,  in the  sense  that exposure  to 
partnering makes companies somewhat more se- 
lective  in their use of strategic partnerships. 
So far, the growth of strategic technology part- 
nering seems to  have  led  to  an  increase  of the 
partnering density among a relatively large group 
of companies.  Important  market  structural  fac- 
tors in this context are the dominance of compa- 
nies from the USA, Japan, and Europe (the Triad) 
and the significant role that is played by many of 
the leading multinational companies. The analy- 
sis of the four sectors in this paper suggests that 
the  dominance of the Triad  has  not  necessarily 
led to a truly internationalisation of partnerships. 
In  particular,  for  sectors  such  as  the  aviation/ 
defence industry and heavy electrical equipment, 
a clear number of in particular Japanese, but also 
US and European, blocks of partnering firms can 
be  identified. For  the  automotive and  chemical 
industries, strategic technology partnering seems 
to have become  less  clustered within regions of 
the  Triad.  An  explanation for these  differences 
could be found in the "globalisation" of markets 
and production for chemicals and motorcars and 
the like, whereas manufacturing-related activities 
in  the  aviation/defence and  automotive  indus- 
tries are  still  more closely linked to their region 
of origin. 
Although  inter-firm  networks  have  become 
more  dense  and  also  exhibit  a  large  degree  of 
stability, one  cannot  interpret  these  findings in 
terms  of  "closed  shops".  There  is  too  much 
movement, as in each sector companies leave and 
enter  the  group  of  leading  cooperating  firms. 
Such  findings  are  generated  both  at  the  more 
aggregate  level  and  in  the  detailed  studies  of 
corporate networks as well as  in the analysis of 
the role of nodal companies in sectoral patterns 
of partnering. As this supports previous findings 
on the structure of strategic technology partner- 
ing in new core  technologies, I  conclude that  a 
number of traits of inter-firm technology cooper- 
ation, as it developed during the 1980s, are clearly 
of a general character. This implies that strategic 
technology partnering is manifest in a large num- 
ber  of sectors of industry and fields of technol- 
ogy, where its growth has led to tighter networks 
of cooperation. In these networks nodal compa- 
nies increasingly weave webs with a large number 
of partners through a wide variety of inter-organi- 
zational modes of cooperation such as joint ven- 
tures, joint  R&D  pacts,  and  technology-sharing 
agreements. The "open" character of these net- 
works, with some degree of stability, indicates the 
dynamic character of the partnering behaviour of 
many leading companies that use their alliances 
as part of a wider competitive strategy. Given the 
modest objective of the present contribution it is 
obvious  that  only  a  few  trends  and  structural 
determinants of strategic  technology partnering 
were studied. Substantial future research is nec- 
essary to  further improve  our  understanding of 
what clearly has become an important aspect of 
current corporate behaviour. 
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Appendix  A.  The  Cooperative  Agreements  and 
Technology  Indicators  (CATI) information  sys- 
tem 
The  CATI  databank  is  a  relational  database 
which  contains  separate  data  files  that  can  be 
linked  to each other and provide aggregate, dis- 
aggregated and  combined  information from sev- 
eral  files.  So  far,  information  on  nearly  10000 
cooperative agreements involving some  3500 dif- 
ferent parent companies has been collected. Sys- 
tematic  collection of inter-firm  alliances  started 
in  1986.  If available,  many sources  from  earlier 
years were consulted, enabling us to take a retro- 
spective  view.  In  order  to  collect  inter-firm  al- 
liances we consulted various sources, of which the 
most  important  are  newspaper  and journal  arti- 
cles, books dealing with the subject, and in partic- 
ular specialized journals which report on business 
events.  Company  annual  reports,  the  Financial 
Times Industrial Companies Yearbooks and Dun 
&Bradstreet's 'Who Owns Whom' provide infor- 
mation  about  dissolved  equity ventures  and  in- 
vestments,  as  well  as  ventures  that  we  did  not 
register when surveying alliances. 
This  method  of information  gathering,  which 
one  might  call  "literature-based  alliance  count- 
ing", has its drawbacks and limitations. 
(1)  In  general  we  have  only  come  to  know 
those  arrangements  that  are  made  public by the 
companies themselves. 
(2) Newspaper and journal reports are likely to 
be  incomplete,  especially when  they go back  in 
history and/or consider firms from countries out- 
side  the  scope  of  the  journal.  Furthermore,  in 
earlier years some journals  simply did  not  exist, 
whilst existing periodicals might grasp the collab- 
oration subject less thoroughly. 
(13) A  low profile of small  firms without well- 
established  names is likely to have their collabo- 
rative links excluded. 
(4) Some journals emphasize fashionable items, 
such as superconductivity or high definition tele- 
vision (HDTV), while interest in "outdated" top- 
ics, such as solar and wind energy, seems to fade 
away. 
(5) The fact that we read mainly articles writ- 
ten  in  English  probably  causes  some  bias  and 
distortion as well. 
(6) Another problem is that information about 
the dissolution of agreements is not systematically 
published.  This is in particular true for licensing 
and  customer-supplier  relationships.  On  the 
other hand,  research contracts and joint product 
developments  have  often  disclosed  time  sched- 
ules.  Equity joint venture and  dissolutions of in- 
vestments  are  published  fairly  systematically  in 
specialized journals. 
(7)  One  final  problem  is  that  the  number  of 
customer-supplier relations and  licensing agree- 
ments is  subject  to great underestimation,  owing 
to the fact that these more casual agreements are 
little  reported  publicly,  even  in  the  professional 
literature. 
Altogether,  these  handicaps  in  the  first place 
lead  to  a  skewed  distribution  in  the  distribution 
of modes of cooperation, followed by some  geo- 
graphic, i.e. Anglo-Saxon, bias.  Next, one has to 
reckon with a possible underestimation of certain 
technological  fields  and  finally,  there  is  some 
over-representation of large firms. 
Despite  these  shortcomings, which  are largely 
unsolvable  even  in  a  situation  of extensive  and 
large-scale data collection, we think we have been 
able to produce a clear picture of the joint efforts 
of many companies.  This  enables  us  to  perform 
empirical  research which goes beyond case stud- 
ies  or  general  statements.  Some  of  the  weak- 
nesses  of the  database  can  easily be  evaded  by 
focusing  on  the  more  reliable  parts,  such  as 
strategic alliances. 
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agreement and  some  information on  companies 
participating in these agreements. The first entity 
is  the inter-firm cooperative agreement. We de- 
fine cooperative agreements as common interests 
between  independent  industrial  partners  which 
are not connected through majority ownership. In 
the CATI database, only those inter-firm agree- 
ments are being collected that contain some ar- 
rangements for  transferring  technology or  joint 
research.  Joint  research  pacts,  second-sourcing 
and licensing agreements are clear-cut examples. 
We also collect information on joint ventures in 
which  new  technology is  received from  at  least 
one of the partners, or on joint ventures having 
some  R&D  program.  Mere  production or  mar- 
keting joint ventures are excluded. In other words, 
our  analysis  is  primarily  related  to  technology 
cooperation.  We  are  discussing  those  forms  of 
cooperation  and  agreements  for  which  a  com- 
bined innovative activity or an exchange of tech- 
nology is at least part of the agreement. Conse- 
quently,  partnerships  are omitted  that  regulate 
no more than the sharing of production facilities, 
the  setting  of  standards,  collusive  behaviour  in 
price-setting and raising entry barriers,  although 
all  of  these  may  be  side  effects  of  inter-firm 
cooperation as we define it. 
We regard as relevant input of information for 
each alliance: the number of companies involved; 
names of companies (or  important subsidiaries); 
year of establishment, time-horizon, duration and 
year  of dissolution;  capital  investments  and  in- 
volvement  of  banks  and  research  institutes  or 
universities; fields of technology; modes of coop- 
eration and some comment or available informa- 
tion  about  progress.  Depending  on  the  actual 
form  of cooperation  we  collect  information on 
the operational context; the name of the agree- 
ment or project; equity sharing; the direction of 
capital or technology flows; the degree of partici- 
pation  in  the  case  of  minority  holdings;  some 
information about motives underlying the alliance 
and the  character of cooperation, such  as  basic 
research,  applied  research,  or  product  develop- 
ment possibly associated with production and/or 
marketing arrangements. In some cases we  also 
indicate who has benefitted most from the agree- 
ment. 
Appendix B 
A  full listing of companies appearing in the MDS networks 
Company  Name of company  Country 
label 
ABB  ABB Asea Brown Boveri AG  SWI 
AEG  AEG  FRG 
AI~ROSPAT  A6rosnatiale (SNIAS)  FRA 
AKZO  Akzo NV  NET 
ALCAN  Alcan Aluminium Ltd  CAN 
ALLIED-S  Allied-Signal Inc  USA 
ALLIS-CH  Allis-Chalmers Corp.  USA 
AMMOTORS  American Motors Corp. (AMC)  USA 
AMOCO  Amoco (Standard Oil-Indiana)  USA 
ARCO  ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Co.)  USA 
ASAHI-CH  Asahi Chemical Industry Co. Ltd.  JPN 
ASEA  Asea AB  SWE 
BABCOCK  Babcock Int. Plc  UK 
BASF  Basf AG  FRG 
BAYER  Bayer AG  FRG 
BECHTEL  Bechtel Group Inc  USA 
BICC  British International Cable Corp.  UK 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Company  Name of company  Country 
label 
BORG-W  Borg-Warner Corp.  USA 
BOSCH  Bosch GmbH  FRG 
BP  British Petroleum Co. Ltd  UK 
BRAEROSP  British Aerospace Plc  UK 
BROWNBOV  Brown Boveri&Co.  AG (BBC)  SWI 
CELANESE  Celanese Corp. (Hoechst Celanese)  USA 
CFP  Cie. Francaise de P&rol (CFP) SA  FRA 
CGE  Cie. G~n~rale  d'l~lectricit~  (CGE)  FRA 
CHIYODA  Chiyoda Group  JPN 
CHRYSLER  Chrysler Motor Corp.  USA 
COGEMA  Cogema SA  FRA 
COMBUST  Combustion Engineering Inc. (C-E)  USA 
CONTIN  Continental AG  FRG 
CUMMINS  Cummins Engine Co.  USA 
DAF  DAF Trucks NV  NET 
DAIMLER  Daimler-Benz AG  FRG 
DASSAULT  Avions N. Dassault-Breguet  FRA 
Aviation 
DENKIKAG  Denki Kagatu Kogyo Co. Ltd  JPN 
DKB  Dai-lchi Kangyo Bank (DKB)  JPN 
Group 
DOW  Dow Chemical Co.  USA 
DSM  DSM NV  NET 
DUPONT  Du Pont de Nemours  USA 
EATON  Eaton Corp.  USA 
EFIN  EFIN  ITA 
ELECTROB  Electrobel SA  BEL 
ELEK-S  Elektro Sandberg  SWE 
ELF-AQUI  ELF Aquitaine  FRA 
ENI  Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI)  ITA 
ENIMONT  Enimont SpA  ITA 
ERICSSON  Ericsson AB  SWE 
EVT  Energie&Verfahrungstechnik  FRG 
GmbH 
EXXON  Exxon Corp.  USA 
FAIRCH-I  Fairchild Industries Inc  USA 
FERRANTI  Ferranti Plc  UK 
FERRUZZI  Ferruzzi SpA  ITA 
FIAR  Fiar SpA  ITA 
FlAT  Fiat SpA  ITA 
FLUIDCAR  Fluidcarbon Int. AB  SWE 
FOKKER  Fokker NV  NET 
FORD  Ford Motor Co.  USA 
FRAMATON  Framatoma SA  FRA 
FRUEHAUF  Fruehauf (K-H Corp.)  USA 
FR.FLICK  Friedrich Flick Industrie KGaA  FRG 
FUJISAWA  Fujisawa  Pharmaceutical  JPN 
FUJI-HI  Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd  JPN 
FUYO  Fuyo Group  JPN 
GE  General Electric Co. (GE)  USA 
GEC  GEC  UK 
GENDYNAM  General Dynamics Corp.  USA 
GHH  Gutehoffnungshiitte Aktien-  FRG 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Company  Name of company  Country 
label 
GM  General Motors Corp.  USA 
HERCULES  Hercules Inc  USA 
HITACHI  Hitachi Ltd  JPN 
HOECHST  Hoechst AG  FRG 
HONDA  Honda Motor Co.  JPN 
HUGHES-A  Hughes Aircraft Co.  USA 
HYUNDAI  Hyundai Corp.  SK 
IBJ  Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ)  JPN 
ICI  Imperial Chemical Industries Plc  UK 
INI  Instituto Nacional de Industria  SPA 
IRI  IRI  ITA 
ISHIKAWH  Ishika-Wajima Harima Co. Ltd  JPN 
ISUZU  Isuzu Motors Ltd  JPN 
IT]?  Int. Tel.&Telegraph Corp. (l'Iq')  USA 
JGC  JGC Corp.  JPN 
JPN-SR  Japan Synthetic Rubber Co. Ltd  JPN 
KEPCO  Korea Electric Power Corp.  SK 
KHD  Kl6ckner-Homboldt-Deutz AG  FRG 
KHIC  Korea Heavy Industries  SK 
&Construct 
KIA  Kia Motors Corp.  SK 
KOMATSU  Komatsu  JPN 
KYOWA-HK  Kyowa Hakko Kogyo  JPN 
LOCKHEED  Lockheed Corp.  USA 
LUCAS  Lucas Industries Plc  UK 
MANNESMN  Mannesmann AG  FRG 
MARTIN-M  Martin-Marietta Corp.  USA 
MASCO  Masco Industries  USA 
MATRA  Matra SA  FRA 
MATSUSHT  Matsushita Elect. Industrial  JPN 
Co. Ltd 
MAZDA  Mazda Motor Co.  JPN 
(Toyo Kogyo Co.) 
MBB  Messerschmitt  -B61kow-Blohm  FRG 
(MBB) 
MCDERMOT  McDermott Int. Inc  USA 
MCD-DOUG  McDonnell Douglas Corp.  USA 
METALLGE  Metallgesellschaft AG  FRG 
MITSUBIS  Mitsubishi Group  JPN 
MITSUI  Mitsui Group  JPN 
NONSANTO  Nonsanto Co.  USA 
MONT-LAD  Montadel Laden  ITA 
NAVISTAR  Navistar Int.  USA 
NESTE  Neste Oy.  FIN 
NIP-STEE  Nippon Steel Corp.  JP 
NISSAN  Nissan Motor Co. Ltd  JPN 
NOBEL-IN  Nobel Industries AB  SWE 
NORSK-HY  Norsk Hydro A/S  NOR 
OCC-PETR  Occidental Petroleum Co. (Oxy)  USA 
OERLIK  Oerlikon Biihrle Holding Ltd  SWI 
OLIN  Olin Corp.  USA 
OLIVETTI  Olivetti SpA  ITA 
PETROFIN  Petrofina SA  BEL 
PHILIPS  Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken NV  NET J. Hagedoorn / Research Policy 24 (1995) 207-231 
Appendix B (continued) 
Company  Name of company  Country 
label 
PHILLIPS  Phillips Petroleum Co.  USA 
PIRELLI  Pirelli SpA  ITA 
PLESSEY  Plessey Co.  UK 
PORSCHE  Porsche AG  FRG 
PSA  Peugeot SA (PSA)  FRA 
RAYTHEON Raytheon Co.  UK 
RENAULT  Renault  FRA 
RHONE-P  Rh6ne-Poulenc  FRA 
ROCKWELL Rockwell  Int. Corp.  USA 
ROLLS-R  Rolls Royce Ltd  UK 
ROVER  Rover Group Plc  UK 
RTZ  Rio Tinto-Zinc Corp. Plc  UK 
SAABSCAN  Saab-Scania  SWE 
SAGEM  Sagem S.A.  FRA 
SANWA  Sanwa Group  JPN 
SAUDIBIC  Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) SAR 
SENER  Sener Ingenieria y Sistemas SA  SPA 
SHELL  Shell Plc NV  NET 
SIEMENS  Siemens AG  FRG 
SIGNAL  Signal Companies Inc.  USA 
SNECMA  Snecma  FRA 
SOCGEN  Soci~t~ G~n~rale  SA/NV  BEL 
SOLVAY  Solvay&Cie. SA  BEL 
SONACA  Sonaca SA  BEL 
SPIE-BAT  Spie Batignolles  FRA 
SULZER  Sulzer AG  SWI 
SUMITOMO  Sumitomo Group  JPN 
SUZUKI  Suzuki Co.  JPN 
TEXACO  Texaco Inc  USA 
TEXTRON  Textron Inc  USA 
THOMSON  Thomson SA  FRA 
THYSSEN  Thyssen AG  FRG 
TOKAI-G  Tokai Group  JPN 
TOSHIBA  Toshiba Corp.  JPN 
TOYOSODA Toyo Soda (Tosoh) Corp.  JPN 
TOYOTA  Toyota Motor Corp.  JPN 
TRACTEBL  Tractebel SA  BEL 
TRW  Thompson Ramo Woolridge Inc  USA 
UNION-C  Union Carbide Corp.  USA 
UN-STIR  United Stirling  SWE 
UN-TECHN  United Technologies Corp. (UTV)  USA 
VALEO  Valeo SA  FRA 
VALMET  Valmet Oy  FIN 
VDT  Van Doorne's Transmissie BV  NET 
VEBA  Veba AG  FRG 
VMF-STRK  VMF-Stork  NET 
VOLVO  Volvo AB  SWE 
VW  Volkswagen AG  FRG 
WESTINGH  Westinghouse  USA 
WESTLAND  Westland Plo  UK 
WR.GRACE  W.R. Grace  USA 
YAMAHA  Yamaha Motor Co.  JPN 
Source: MERIT/CATI. 
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